CHAPTER ONE: Goals


Code	What the advisors hoped to accomplish during their tour
0049 M0620 V54-55	By the time I went out there, in the summer of 1954, we knew nothing about the Vietnamese Marine Corps. It didn't exist. It was just Army units that worked with the Navy. These were the Commando units that worked with the Navy River Forces. They were not part of the River Forces. They were Army units that were designated for duty with the Navy. The decision was made to organize an ad hock specialist organization, use that mechanism to transfer responsibility to the Americans. The trouble with that was that the French were not really advisors. They commanded these units. The French Navy Advisory Group was actually in command of the Vietnamese Navy. The slim Navy section was organized to support five sections, an Army which was overwhelmingly large, an Air Force section, a Navy section, and there was a Special Operations section, sort of spook guys. The Navy section was headed by a French Naval officer. I was assigned to that section. He didn't know what to do with me because ... nobody knew what to do with anybody. He told me to go out and get acquainted, get familiar with the various river forces, and what was left of the whole mobilization process that was ongoing after the Indochina war. There were about 200,000 Vietnamese troops in the Vietnamese Armed Forces when the war (with the French) ended. And these must be demobilized pretty fast, because nobody knew where the money was coming from to support them. So the Americans made up their mind to contribute during the confusing, difficult, and awkward period. A French officer who had been a commando organizer and unit commander, Captain Delayen, was confronted with a group of Vietnamese who were immobilized and on the way home. He worked with the French Navy. He said, "Look, I have a Commando Unit waiting to go home, and they are just going to disperse in the country-side. This is a terrible waste of a good opportunity." He said "How about me gathering them up into a battalion, and taking them down to Nha Trang, where the Naval schools are?" The French Navy said "Sure, it is a great idea. Go ahead and do it." So Captain Delayen took a Battalion of Vietnamese Commandos and moved them to Nha Trang, where they build their own camp. And that was one of the places I visited in my orientation tour. I met him and was tremendously impressed with what he was doing. We agreed that what he was doing was well worth saving. Now the question was to have his organization officially recognized by the Americans. And, to be put on a support list so that we could go ahead and provide equipment and funding, to ensure its survival. If that had not been done, there was no way in which the unit could have survived. It was not in the TO and had nothing planned or forecast. So we agreed that Delayen would work with the unit and keep it training in Nha Trang. And, that I would go back to Saigon and tell the French Navy Captain, who was then my boss, that the new Vietnamese battalion would be incorporated in American support figures. He said "You go right ahead and do anything you want." So I did. The French Captain, Delayen, gathered the troops and I gathered the funding and organization for their upkeep and survival.
0050 M06__ V55-57 V68-69	I was with the 3rd Division in Japan and got message orders to go to Vietnam. I was enthusiastic about the assignment, primarily since it was an active area and the French just pulled out. The tail end of the French was still there. My hope was just to do the best I could with a Vietnamese embryonic Marine Unit. I had to be careful because they were not "virgins" when it came to combat.
0031 M06__ V62	My expectations were virtually non-existent; upon receipt of dispatch orders at the Fuji training area, I had no idea that Marine personnel were/would be assigned to advisor duties in the RVN. There was no "heads-up" from either my parent command nor from HQMC about this prospective assignment, hence there was no guidance/ information upon which to make any plans except to promptly obey my orders. Within 48 hours of those orders, I was in the RVN.
0039 M0523 V62-63	Improve the Vietnamese Marines' planning competence at the battalion and company levels. lmprove their use of combined arms at a time when the Vietnamese had US Marine and US Army helicopter support as well as their own organic artillery support. Close air support was also provided by propeller driven armed training aircraft manned by a Vietnamese pilot with an American in the back seat.
0026 M0630 V63-64	To make intelligence a preoccupation at all levels of command. To exploit intelligence aggressively in combat operations.
0008 M0527 V63	To gain experience in a combat environment and to apply my Marine Corps experiences to a military situation not controlled by US interest. To assist foreign nationals in obtain the independents they were seeking
0035 MW324 V63-64	To teach the Vietnamese some of our modern U.S. Marine Corps techniques.
0024 M0630 V64-65 G81-82	Stand up a new infantry battalion and learn what was being taught at the RVN Vietnamese Marine "Boot Camp." Gain combat experience as an infantry BN Advisor.
0029 M0835 V64-65	1- To be as much help to the VNMC Battalion as possible. 2- To establish a good rapport with the Bn Cmdr & Staff and the Company Commanders. I wanted them to have faith in me and I wanted to have faith in them.
0034 M0632 V64-65	To build a strong Vietnamese Marine Corps and keep it loyal to the government in the existing "coup" environment.
0040 M0427 V64-65 V72	To go to war. To participate in combat operations. To defeat the enemy. To help stabilize the government of South Vietnam. To help benefit the people of South Vietnam.
0036 M0629 V65,68-69	Stay alive! Provide professional advice, assistance, especially in areas of combat operations to allow VNMC to be successful in ops; ensure I maintained USMC reputation at highest level.
0023 M0530 V65-66	To provide training, advice, and insight to my counterpart on modern tactics and techniques (circa 1965) of warfare.
0033 M0520 V65-66	I had hoped to guide the Vietnamese Regional Forces on basic infantry tactics.
0018 M0637 V66-67	In general, I believed I could contribute to winning the war. Specifically, I hoped to increase the professional competence of the Vietnamese Marines. In training--before my tour began--I had no certain ideas as to how I would do this.
0038 M0423 V66-67	It was hoped the assistance to the VN armed forces would enable them to become strong enough to defend their country without U.S. help.
0028 M0514 V70-71	To participate in effective combat operations (especially as opposed to spending a year on Okinawa).
0004 M0520 V67-68	Be competent, stay alive, learn my job and come home.
0007 N0527 V67-68	I hoped to modernize the medical capabilities of the Viet Nam Marine Corps.
0019 M0304 V67	1. Share some of the combat knowledge and experience that I gained during my first tour in Vietnam (1965-1966) 2. Provide technical assistance where required 3. Provide liaison with US units on joint operations for assets and additional fire support 4. Kill a large number of the enemy
0002 M0520 V68-69	To assist the Vietnamese Bn. Cdr I was assigned to as a Covan in accomplishing his mission by providing combined arms support when required, wise counsel, and a "Can Do" attitude at all times.
0027 M0633 V68-69	As Senior Advisor to CMC of S. Vietnam, I had a mission of advising (assisting) him in building and training a M.C. that would emulate the USMC as to combat effectiveness, spirit, and durability - and to assist in ongoing operations against N. Vietnam. (1968-69)
0011 MW431 K62-63 V68-69	Like all advisors to work myself out of a job.
0001 M0323 V68-69	I was assigned as the G-1 / Admin Advisor. I had hoped to bring USMC methods to the VNMC and improve the administrative procedures employed within the unit and within the VNMC.
0015 M0632 V68-69	Work myself out of a job. Provide US assets to the advised.
0042 ME720 V68-69	To teach and instruct the unit and personnel of the country I was in, and to learn of them myself.
0012 M0523 V67-68 V71-72	To advise my VNMC counterpart such as to improve the tactics and operational effectiveness of the VNMC battalion of which he was XO - and to be a conduit for US supporting arms and other tactical support, as needed by the tactical situation of the battalion
0032 M0525 V69-70	When the U.S. 9th Inf Div, the first US division to be withdrawn from VN in 1969, departed the MeKong Delta, (DONGTAM) I was tasked with helping the VN Navy and Marine Corps from an amphibious task force. Its purpose was to take over the US 9th Inf Div AO, and jointly employ the armored landing craft, floating howitzer platforms, and other material and camp left behind.
0003 M0322 V69-70	Do a good job and survive, due to a bad taste in my mouth about the ARVN during my 1st tour. They always delayed their kick-off time in combined attacks, and when we reached the objective the camp fires were still smoldering. Uncle "Charlie" was gone!!!
0010 M0833 V69-70 S90-91	As an advisor with the Vietnamese Marine Corps during two tours in 1969-70 and as the CO, 3rd Marines responsible for coordinating a reciprocal training program with the 2nd Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard, during the Gulf War in 1990-91, my basic goals were to serve and support those respective militaries. The fundamental goals were to teach and train, motivate and mentor, and coach and counsel the Vietnamese and Saudi officers and enlisted. Throughout my time as an advisor I came to instinctively and intuitively understand and appreciate that what I did for them may have been helpful and important, but that what I helped teach them to do for themselves was decidedly much more important. What advisors do for others may be important, but what we advise others to do for themselves is the essence of serving as an advisor.
0006 M0210 V69-70	Building confidence in my counterparts
0005 M0734 V70-71 C56-58	Make the Vietnamese Marines capable of managing the various programs once the U. S. withdrew.
0037 M0628 V70-71	When I reported in to the Marine Advisory Unit early in June 1970, I was told that I would relieve the senior advisor to Brigade "A" (later Brigade 147) VNMC, then operating near Neak Luong, Cambodia. The Vietnamese Marines had experienced a string of successes since the beginning of the Cambodian incursion; support for the enemy forces in the Delta had suddenly dried up once we closed the port of Sihanoukville and chewed up about six months' worth of their supplies stashed along the Viet-Cambot border; and we were even making plans to go after COSVN headquarters, reportedly set up along the border somewhere. If our fortunes had shifted so markedly in the Delta, could the battle up north be far behind? The NVA still seemed to be licking their wounds after taking a severe beating during the 1968 Tet Offensive and the "siege" of Khe Sanh. We were winning, and I wanted to help push the VNMC across the finish line. As the tour progressed, I realized that there still was a lot of war left, and that the burden would fall increasingly on the Vietnamese as more and more U.S. units left country, at (to me) an almost unseemly pace. As Division G-3 advisor in Saigon, I worked to finalize force structure at division strength and to convince the Vietnamese Marines that their days of steady growth were over. This did not go over well, and things were tense with our counterparts for a time. After a while, our VN buddies got the message. They began to ask (in private): "When are you (the U.S.) going to pull the plug on us? Don't tell us you're not-just tell us when, so we can do something for our families." Early in 1971 , we got ready for Operation Lam Son 719, a Vietnamese-run show to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, using Khe Sanh as our base of operations. Our biggest task was to take the Marines to the field as a full division for the first time-rather than three independent brigades. This required some major organizational restructuring (such as creating a "field" division headquarters from scratch) and-as we were to learn during the operation-some major cultural changes as well. Lam Son 719 relied on Vietnam's elite units-Marines, Airborne. Rangers, and the 1st ARVN Division-supported by the U.S. 101st Airborne's helicopters, operating out of Camp Eagle, near Phu Bai. There also was some armor and artillery support available from the 1st of the 5th Mech Infantry, until they were redeployed back to the States in mid-operation. The operation began well, but a combination of monsoon weather and increasing enemy opposition-along with the political indecision of President Thieu caused the operation to stall and become a bloody standoff (despite being reported in the U.S. media as a disaster). One of the three Marine brigades (147) took severe punishment, but managed to knock an NVA regiment right out of their Order of Battle, in the process. There were a ton of lessons learned, and we set about grimly to re-build the Vietnamese Marine Division. I am convinced that this baptism of fire was instrumental in the VNMC's gallant stand a year later in the 1972 Easter Offensive. Thus, my expectations were high when I first went into Cambodia, then moved toward reality as my tour progressed. We went into Lam Son 719 with hopes of repeating the previous year's success in Cambodia. Indeed, if the Vietnamese had listened to our most senior advisors (including General Abrams) and stayed on the ground (instead of relying on helos in deteriorating weather), cutting then sitting on the trail, they could have cut off remaining NVA forces in South Vietnam and starved them out. It was a potential war-stopper, if not a war-winner. By the end of my tour, I had abandoned hopes for glorious victory and was trying to prepare my VNMC buddies to hang on by their fingernails as long as possible.
0046 M0420 V70-71	To demonstrate to my counterpart and his associates a sincere enthusiasm and commitment to accomplish the assigned mission.
0044 M0303 V70-71	As a first tour junior officer, I hoped to contribute in some small way to the mission of the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU).
0048 M06 V71	Most third world countries have a tradition of thievery and bribery in business transactions. The Division Engineer Battalion submitted projects for approval, and the materials were picked up, usually at dockside warehouses. The Engineer Advisor, of necessity, went along with the armed convoy to insure that if 184 bags of cement were authorized, that 184 bags were issued, moved to the construction site, placed under lock and key, and ultimately went into the project. Close supervision and inventory control is required on almost everything that passes thru the unit. RVN Battalion Commanders were issued cash to feed their units. The Medical Advisor found that wounded personnel stayed in hospital three times longer than was normal. The reason was lack of protein to rebuild tissue. Discussions with the Commandant/Division Commander led to pressure on the Battalion C.O.s to stop pocketing the food money. A side effect of this bad practice was that it led to thievery from villagers by the hungry troops, with consequent loss of faith in the government by the people. Some popular and local force units were known to sell ammunition and medical supplies.
0013 M0630 V71-72	Try and make sure that the Vietnamese Marines performed to the best of their capability and, on a personal level, make a contribution to the war effort.
0045 M0536 V71-72	I hoped to gain a firm understanding of the Vietnamese plight and support the advisory mission in any way that was beneficial.
0021 M0521 V71-72	To provide input and guidance to my counterpart to enable him to expeditiously provide accurate and timely artillery support to the Vietnamese Marine infantry.
0022 M0526 V71-72	1.Increase proficiency and tactical professionalism. 2.Live. 3.Experience "a" way to run a wartime Bn. 4.Become more proficient in Supporting Arms. 5.See a different part of Vietnam. 6.Note any differences at Bn. level USMC vs. VNMC. 7. Stay out of trouble. 8. Assist when possible the mission of the Bn.
0051 M0715 V71-72	Assist the Vietnamese govt survive.
0020 M0320 V72-73	My initial goals were mostly selfish. In 1967, as a 2ndLt, I had served in RVN as a rifle platoon commander with H/2/26. Throughout my 7 month tour, before being wounded and evacuated, I was an average plt cmdr doing all those things normally done - squad & plt patrols, strong point security, fire base security, and participation in major multi-battalion operations. My platoon suffered several KIA and many more WIA, but inflicted heavier losses on the VC and NVA. Nevertheless, I had little feeling of real accomplishment, other than keeping most of my troops alive, while accomplishing our assigned mission. With the war winding down in 1971, I asked my monitor if I could get back to RVN instead of being assigned to 3rd MarDiv Okinawa. Fortunately, he found a slot for me in MACV as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. I reported to the VNMC in mid-January 1972, with the goal of simply doing the best I could to help the VNMC and the RVN prepare for our impending abandonment.
0016 M0628 V72-73	Survive and return to my family
0017 M0732 V72-73	Provide tangible proof that the US was in support of our ally, South Vietnam. Provide support to the VNMC by providing and coordinating US naval gunfire and US air support, as well as military advice, as appropriate.
0043 M0643 V72	I was not a CoVan, I was a volunteer, "Summer Help." I managed U.S. Assets (Air/Naval Gunfire) for Vietnamese Marine Infantry Battalions. During spring offensive I served 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 9th battalions in the 6-month TAD tour - I wanted and tried to do the best damned job possible.
0030 ME730 V72-73	Provide the best support possible to my unit. I wasn't given much information about the type of duty therefore didn't actually know what was expected of me in this type billet.
0009 M0628 V72-73	To teach tactics and use of supporting arms.
0014 M0320	Not really sure what to expect limited any real "objectives" prior to arriving in-country.