CHAPTER ELEVEN: Comments and Recommendations


Code	Additional comments and suggestions
0049 M0620 V54-55	I've got records of people. As a matter of fact, there is a French Warrant Officer that I have been corresponding with. He wrote one of these personal books on his experiences in Indochina as a young soldier going out there. And, he fell in love with the people so much that after his first tour of duty, when he was entitled to go home for six weeks of R&R, he asked to return early. He missed his friends. An awful lot of that relationship existed between the French and the Vietnamese. I found that the Americans felt the same way. Primarily, the American Marine likes the idea of getting involved with the people, becoming part of their unit, and learning to eat their food. It's very important.
0050 M06__ V55-57 V68-69	I was there twice, June of 1955 for two years, to roughly June of 1957. The second one was a wartime tour, the Summer of 1968 to the Summer of 1969 as an Advisor. The second tour, there was a lot of difference. The appearance. The Vietnamese Marines Honor Guard at the Headquarters was first rate. They were real fine looking people. In 1968, I was the Assistant Senior Advisor. I spent a lot of time wandering around in III Corps and IV Corps. I was very pleased with what I saw with the Marine Battalions. I had a cocktail party to get familiar socially with some of the officers of the Battalion. I did know enough not to have completely booze. I had a lot of soft drinks as well as liquor. They showed up, and not one of them drank the booze. This gets down to learning the characteristics, and likes a dislikes of the people. I found it was pretty well true everywhere I went with the Vietnamese. You don't make friends with them like in the States with your own contemporaries. I only had three, what I considered, good friends. One was a 2nd Lieutenant, ____ ____ ____, who apparently was not all that well appreciated in the Marine Corps circles. He had transferred to the Army, when I ran into him during my second tour. He finally got out of Vietnam as a Brigadier General. He was the last commander of the 2nd ARVN Division. He lives in Southern California. The Naval Officer I mentioned, ____ ____ ____, was also a good friend. Both stayed at my home in the States. ____ ____ ended up the last CNO of the Vietnamese Navy. He also lives in Southern California. I still exchange Christmas Cards with him.
0039 M0523 V62-63	The year I spent with the 2nd Battalion was the most enjoyable tour of my career. I hope I have been of some help.
0026 M0630 V63-64	I may be wrong but I am burdened with the impression that Asian cultures, for one, are regarded as strange, unfamiliar, and eccentric and that we must be schooled to understand and deal with the differences. This may be the case but in my experience, military service seems to conduce to conventionality and conformity to a world view. This became apparent to me when the foreign military person spoke English enabling an exchange of views. It was true in Vietnam with all ranks of VN Marines and in my contacts with foreign military personnel as the CO of a Med Bn (notably Turkish, Greek, Italian). I believe a well-schooled, trained, experienced, and principled officer is the basic requirement. He can learn about cultural differences and how to deal with them on the job.
0008 M0527 V63	The lessons I learned in the short time I spent with the 2d Vietnamese Marine Battalion helped me greatly when I commanded a Marine Company in 1968. These lessons also helped me a great deal as a Battalion S-3 in 1969
0035 MW324 V63-64	We all know the U.S. Marine Corps is highly respected around the world. The Vietnamese Marines highly respected the U.S. Marine uniforms & equipment. For example, the Marine Corps emblem was a very important item to have with you. The Vietnamese Marines loved to wear the U.S. Marine emblem on their uniforms or caps.
0024 M0630 V64-65 G81-82	Good luck.
0040 M0427 V64-65 V72	Sorry-ass motor transport "pogue" survives and thrives as an infantry advisor: When I went to Vietnam on my first tour of duty as an advisor, I had never used a field radio or called in an air strike or an artillery fire mission. I had to learn how to do all of that with on-the-job training. You learn quickly, especially when someone like Bill _____ is monitoring your progress. Dealing with the enemy was not nearly as difficult as trying to live up to his standards and expectations. Better training beforehand would have been beneficial. Who knew? We didn't see it coming. MORE: We found that it was virtually impossible to call in surprise artillery fire on the enemy. You first had to tell the fire direction center where you were and where the enemy was located. We weren't always quite sure of either of those locations, given the nature of the terrain we operated in. We thus had to first call in a marking round and adjust from there. This was usually a yellow smoke round. On one occasion that round landed three feet in front of us, validating our technique. We found that when fast movers arrived overhead they expected us to give them a target. They couldn't return to their base with all that ordnance hanging under their wings. When they made their run-ins they would first drop napalm then bombs and rockets. The troops loved the napalm. It made a spectacular show although I'm not sure how effective it was. We seldom got to check out an area that had just been hit. Since we had effectively silenced enemy fire we assumed we had killed some enemy troops. The air strike leader always wanted us to give him a bomb damage assessment. Since we couldn't check things out we just made something up based upon the volume of fire we had been receiving from the enemy. It usually satisfied them. They always did an outstanding job. We found we could talk to an air force flight leader, but not a Navy or Marine Corps flight leader. Our radios weren't compatible. We had to use a FAC to call-in Navy or Marine Corps air strikes. He would orbit overhead and relay our instructions. You wonder how you will perform under fire. No problem. You're too busy doing what you have to do to give much thought to enemy small arms fire. It's just something that is irritating, something that makes it harder to do your job. We found that the enemy could easily locate you if you used a whip antenna on your field radio. It was sometimes hard to communicate with your rifle companies when you used the shorter tape antenna. As soon as you switched to the whip antenna the bullets would start zipping around you, making you most unpopular with the little guy who carried the field radio. Loss of sleep was a constant problem. You were up at night responding to an enemy probe or calling in H and I fires. Then you were on the move during the day. Some mistakes were made because of your sleep loss impaired state of mind. It wasn't anything you couldn't correct, but you always had to remind yourself that you couldn't rely on your own judgment without pumping up your brain to deal with your situation. We didn't take any drugs to counteract the sleeplessness. I hope they have something our guys can take nowadays to try to stay awake and alert. I don't know that you have compiled any information on this and I don't know that it makes much difference anyway, but I've always wondered how our advisors felt about traveling with Vietnamese units that saw a lot of combat. The battalion that Pete _____ and Phil _____ advised got wiped out at Binh Gia and it didn't seem to affect them in a noticeable way afterwards. Bill _____ saw a lot of combat before he was killed and it didn't seem to bother him either. He was always on top of every situation. Some of our advisors did become somewhat paranoid after several months in the field, but it only manifested itself in a quiet way. Some of them would burn their mail after they read it and had destroyed any photos of their families that they had carried in their wallets. I didn't see anyone carrying a grenade on a shoulder strap of their uniform with the pin loosened, but just about everyone always kept a round in the chamber of each weapon they carried. These things were ostensibly done to prevent giving the enemy any information they could use if the advisor were to be captured by them. I also always wondered how many guys had vowed to fall on their swords to prevent being captured. No one ever said anything about it. We'll probably never know. I did have a friend and former classmate at A.W.S. who visited me at 1st MAR DIV HQ during my second tour of duty in Vietnam. He was an advisor to an ARVN army unit. Those guys were pretty bad. All you had to do was observe them on an operation to then count yourself fortunate to be traveling with the Vietnamese Marines. My friend, Herb, was a little bit wild-eyed. He had an air of desperation about him. He'd been in some serious combat with the ARVN unit and it had definitely scarred him. He asked me to keep a .38 caliber revolver for him in case he might be moving through the area and would need it. Herb was storing weapons all over Vietnam. It was his security blanket. I took the weapon and we talked awhile about his situation. Much of what he said was punctuated by his shaking his head in a negative movement and uttering a rueful, almost maniacal laugh about his experiences. You got the idea that the disjointed laughter was pretty much all he had to keep himself going. Herb survived however, and came back and picked up his revolver as his tour ended. By then, he was at times almost incoherent and could not hold a prolonged conversation without his attention wandering to something that seemed to be bothering him. He would drift away for a moment to his private hell and then snap back and look at you like he had just discovered that you were present. In relation to the foregoing I never heard anyone say they gave any thought to the necessity of killing enemy soldiers. It was just something you did. Better them than your guys getting killed by the enemy. I never felt any compassion for the enemy although we sometimes did respect their military competence. They could move whole units very quickly on the field of battle and were usually ready to exploit any perceived advantage. Best of everything to you and your staff. Did anyone ever give a moment's thought about the necessity of killing wounded enemy soldiers after a firefight? What else could you do with them? You had to get on the move again. If you called in a Dust-off, you used it to medevac your own wounded. You killed them with the enemy weapons you had picked up on the battle site. There was no reason to expend your own ammunition on the wounded enemy. We once tried booby trapping enemy corpses so the VC would blow themselves away when they came back to retrieve them. It was very satisfying to hear the grenades explode in the distance as the VC met a well-deserved fate. Unfortunately we soon discovered that the VC made local villagers go out and retrieve the corpses, so we had to stop booby-trapping them. I was in Quang Tri City after the Easter Offensive of 1972. Our Vietnamese Marines were making marketable souvenirs out of dried and bleached enemy skulls. They had figured out a way to attach the lower jaw so you could make the skull's mouth open and close. I now wish I had bought a couple of them. Lamps. ARE YOU GOING TO PUBLISH ANYTHING? I WOULD THINK YOU COULD COMPILE SOME FASCINATING ARTICLES FOR THE GAZETTE. WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING. CAN'T GET ENOUGH. Has anyone ever written anything about Captain _____'s one-man amphibious landing up the coast from Saigon? _____ uncovered a huge cache of AK-47's. Two VC came out of the trees and tried to set up a machine gun so they could drill _____. He strolled over to them and potted both of them with his .45 pistol. He's dead now. NICK _____ or DICK _____ may know something about it. The main thing you have to realize as an advisor is that you have only yourself and your fellow advisors to rely upon during combat operations. You're responsible for the fortunes and misfortunes of the battalion you're advising. They expect you to use good judgment and to be out there in the forefront of the action. You soon realize how fortunate you are to be in that position. You want to do well. You only have your prior training and your past experiences to draw upon to help you get the job done.
0034 M0632 V64-65	My tour as an advisor was from May '64 through Feb '65! We had the finest advisors in the field that could be found. I had been an attaché to RVN & Cambodia from 1959 - 1961! I respected the Vietnamese people. Thought that I understood them. Sometimes I was right - sometimes I was wrong!
0029 M0835 V64-65	Our groups of advisors went to French language school for 19-20 weeks. I went for 4 weeks and was called out to replace an advisor who was killed. We did not need to go to French Lang. We should have studied Vietnamese. MATA at Ft. Bragg started after I was in country so can't comment on that. Tom - Sorry this is late. Have been on the road the past month. My time as an advisor was 40 years ago, so hope something I wrote will be of use.
0023 M0530 V65-66	It is absolutely essential that the advisors have an understanding of the culture - all aspects of it - that he is entering. Language training would be extremely nice to have. Keep an open mind - be adaptable, be polite, and be professional. One thing I learned the hard way - Don't speak French to someone who hates the French. But, communicate! You must communicate!
0036 M0629 V65,68-69	Most important - Be patient - you are an advisor not a Commander. Be fit & mentally tough - only 2 Marines w/ 600+ VNMC. Remember - when in Rome do as the Romans. - You eat, sleep, bathe just like the troops you're advising. Understand the culture & respect it. If you can't speak their language, eat their food, exist as they do, you can't be successful. Except for some brief stand-downs at Base Camp we spent 24/7 with the VNMC. Take no special favors. Some advisors for example would pack in their own food & not eat w/ counterpart Bn officers. They didn't last or weren't as effective.
0033 M0520 V65-66	Thank you for the opportunity to participate in your survey. I hope I can provide something useful. Although nearly forty years have passed, the impressions remain clear. Good luck on your survey. It is worthy undertaking. I was assigned as an advisor in Naval Advisory Group for a one year tour of duty which began in June 1965. It was my only Vietnam tour. From there I went to Marine Corps Command and Staff college as a student. I served 20 years on active duty and retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1974. Good luck on your survey. It is a worthy undertaking.
0018 M0637 V66-67	I see the tasks of an advisor breaking out into two very different categories. An advisor involved solely in training in a static location needs very different skills than an advisor assigned to a combat unit. The latter must not only train his counterparts, he must be prepared to assist in the actual fighting that his unit encounters. He needs a much larger and varied set of skills than an advisor conducting training in a "school" setting. A "school" advisor must be proficient in his skill and as an instructor, but duties such as FAC and FO are not nearly as critical for him as the unit advisor. A course preparing an advisor to train should be different from one preparing an advisor to serve with a unit in the field.
0028 M0514 V70-71	I suffered two incidences of requiring intravenous fluids in my first RVN tour with 1/1. These were because of high fever brought on by parasites. Two or three months into my tour in El Salvador I suffered a debilitating bout with Shigella caused by drinking the water (at a permanent "department" headquarters in the northeast of the country), at a place called San Francisco de Gotera. In my tour with the Vietnamese Marines, I do not believe I missed a day of duty because of illness. "Old wives tale" or not, Butch Neal advised me during the ride from the airport to the BOQ that the US Marines who ate "cai ut" didn't get worms, and the ones who did not were hospitalized because of worms. Lesson learned: The water is bad all around the world, and our anti-bodies do not include those inherent to our "hosts." If the old hands advise eating or drinking something "new," do it!
0019 M0304 V67	I would like to be part of any training initiative with USMC officer going to Iraq or Afghanistan as I served with the first combined action company (CAC 3) in Phu Bai during 1965 and 1966, and as a COVAN 1967 to 1968, then as a battery commander who worked closely with the local CAP units near Hill 65 and the supported the advisor-led nungs during their excursions in Laos. Please let me know how I can be of assistance as I have been developing multimedia training for the government, military and business for the past 30 years!
0004 M0520 V67-68	I cannot really describe an event that went well or one that failed. It is important to understand that the role of the Marine Advisor in Vietnam was not to be an advisor in terms of what to do. The VN Marines had been fighting and fighting well for years. My role was to observe, maybe offer suggestions, but most importantly to be the liaison for air support, combined ops with the Mobile Riverine Force, and the helos of the US Army.
0007 N0527 V67-68	Although most mature Marines already know how to do this, skill in utilizing available resources is enormously beneficial. This skill is sometimes referred to as 'cumshaw' the art of diverting resources under someone else's control to a useful purpose in pursuit of your objectives. When employed, this art can increase effectiveness and save time in achieving objectives.
0012 M0523 V67-68 V71-72	I had 47 weeks of intensive VN Language training, to include history, culture, and all aspects of Vietnamese life plus extensive learning of Vietnamese military units, tactics and terminology which was very helpful, not only in my role of advising my counterparts, but also to keep abreast on unit morale and combat readiness, etc by non-obvious listening to conversations within my hearing in Vietnamese
0015 M0632 V68-69	Failure to convince your counterpart to change his ways should not be regarded as a professional failure. Some of these people just don't think like we do and never will! (and that is not always bad)
0027 M0633 V68-69	I served on the Mid-East Desk, (1965-66) and observed MAGs in Iran and Saudi-Arabia. The Far East & Mid-East have many similarities, as well as divergences in some particulars. These MAGs were very effective - in fact the Shah of Iran kept the Chief of Mission as his personal confidant and on extended tours. For treatises on Iraq and Kabul I recommend that you get some input from MAG personnel - 1964 - to the Iran revolution. A Major _____, WA, Chief of MAG _____, Iran was particularly effective there with the locals at AHWAZ and surrounds. Best of luck with your task, LVC. P.S. Col Mike _____ (in Frederick, MD) is prime source for any detailed specifics you may need. And Col _____, RVNCM (Ret), employed by IBM and residing somewhere near you in VA I believe, can give you OS input of the receiving country. Also, either or both would be OS guest speakers or seminar members. P.S. When I was de-briefed in FMF PAC en route to CONUS (by BGen ____ _____), I made the statement that the VN Marines were like US Marines - they could and would do anything asked of them and do a professional job of it. Gen _____ looked skeptical, upon which I repeated that I considered them equals of US Marines as riflemen and probably superior in mortars and artillery. If you would check - check with Col _____ there at Quantico. I think he will verify that events 3 or 4 years later will substantiate my evaluation. I say this to reinforce my belief that COVANS epitomize the utilization of advisors in developing forces (countries), so that you can confidently use their input in your presentations, as possibly opposed to US Army Advisors (input), those who did not live off the terrain, eat, sleep, wear the uniform of those they "advised" while I was in VN.
0032 M0525 V69-70	1- In VN it seemed a wide social gap existed between the senior leaders, and the troops. I always felt safe, and was very well protected by the troopers. I honestly feel this was because of my attitude towards all VN personnel I came in contact with. I resented the senior commanders non-caring attitude toward the wounded and dying. 2- For an excellent story about the U.S. 9th Inf Div see "Steal My Soldiers' Hearts" by Col. David Hackworth. We both arrived in the Div. at the same time. 3- Thirty five years ago is a long time. Don't know if any of the enclosed is useful - but we did lose several USMC lieutenants and captains - so I like to thin that experience does help.
0003 M0322 V69-70	I'm only 30 mi down the road in Spotsylvania. If I can help let me know. I don't have to have my name on my report. But will include it for communication purposes. Phone 1-540-582-5936
0010 M0833 V69-70 S90-91	I am now with the Joint Forces Command in the Warfare Experimentation Directorate. I have the occasion to periodically travel to Quantico and may be available to participate in a panel or to informally discuss advisor duty with your students. I'd be honored to support them and this program. Thoughts for Trainers/Advisors: Build relationships: personal & professional. Turn on lights - operate in shadows & shine spotlight on hosts. Be a student as well as a teacher. The universal language is a smile - it's positive & it's powerful. Share hardships & American values. Embrace host culture & lifestyle. Work yourself out of a job. Summary: What you do as an advisor/trainer to help your host countries is important, but more important is what you do to help them help themselves.
0005 M0734 V70-71 C56-58	Set up a data base of all past and present Advisors that served in Asia or the Middle East , particularly those with programming and technical support experience. Use Berlitz or similar schools to teach basic Arabic, then send them to the theater for 1-2 months immersion.
0047 M05__ V70-71	Just a quick note: "Advising" is the most challenging job the MARCOR has to offer: (1) Not everyone (Marine) can be an advisor! (2) Don't send/assign one to advisory duties unless the Marine volunteers/requests the assignment. (3) Don't assign any Marine advisory duties unless he can "speak" the language. (4) MARCOR should put together a Marine Advisor's Course ASAP - exactly like the MAC-RVN course at Quantico in 1968-1969 - No fluff to class - 8 to 5 daily and half day on Saturday (P.T. after 1700). Generally a dummy Captain like me can pass with max effort. I finished one of 16 in the 1968-1969 class. (5) Remember that it will take 3-4 months (90-120 days) in the field to really/really become proficient in the language! (6) The advisor has to expect the worst of conditions as an advisor. Long hours, politics, poor food, poor living conditions, poor communications on both sides (U.S. and Iraqi). Expect danger at every step. Expect to have the "opposition" in your camp - no sleep with the .9MM or .45Cal locked! Not really! But be alert - I was riding on a motorcycle in Can Tho and a VC on another motorcycle pulled up to our left flank with a pistol. My counterpart turned quickly into the enemy - wrecking his aim and his moped. Just another day in the life of an advisor. (7) Be aware that some Marines will be getting their ticket punched - only - don't care about the Iraqis! (8) Advisors must always conduct themselves in a "proper" manner. Honest and truthful and ethical - there are no shortcuts! So much for a quick note. We have just completed a near 6 month PCS! Moved about 25 miles - toughest move I ever made. It takes a lot of "spirit" to be an advisor. One needs to look for that "input" in the Monitor shops. I understand from my peers that I was a successful advisor. Was never a 1st Lieutenant or 2nd Lieutenant and never went to TBS. But did the deed! How can I help you? How can I help the MARCOR? If I can do anything - appear? write? discussion group? You only have to ask me. Questions? Ask me. Sorry for the quick "write." We are under the gun today. Thanks for the promotion. I was a Major of Marines.
0046 M0420 V70-71	I was assigned as Senior Advisor to the 4th Battalion VNMC. Conducted field operations in Cambodia and Northern I-Corps. Quang Tri Province.
0044 M0303 V70-71	The MAU was staffed by outstanding Marines and this helped throughout my tour as an advisor.
0025 M0520 V70-71	Language and culture. Culture and language. I've only filled out and commented in that area because these 2 trivialize all the other elements in the survey. To circumvent this fact with peripheral issues (aspirations, perceptions, training, skills, etc.) is to dodge the core issue -- which is the most difficult one.
0022 M0526 V71-72	Hopefully Billy Keys was one of the people who responded to this. At the time he was the monitor at HQMC. It would be great to get his input on "who were the advisors". Another variable you may want to explore is why Marines want to be advisors. For me there were a number of reasons. As a Major at the time I was offered the choice of being an advisor or going to the 3dMARDIV on OKI. Been there as an enlisted Marine for 18 months and couldn't think of a thing I had lost. That was a no brainer-A staff job or going to the only game in town. Next while going through the Advisor school in Quantico, former COVANs would tell us their experiences. I remember that the theme was one of working in IV Corps, Shrimp the size of lobsters, little contact and great liberty. While attending the school the AO of the VNMC was changed to northern I Corps. In my first tour I got as far south as Phu Bai. The second tour I got all the way south to DaNang. So much for seeing a different part of Vietnam.
0048 M06 V71	The Vietnamese were small in comparison to the Advisors, and the .45 caliber pistol was built for large hands and large frames. It was heavy to lug around, yet was standard issue for the VNMC. Their regulations were lax and they could carry any weapon they could get. It was sort of a badge of pride to be able to carry anything but a .45 Auto. I obtained a bucket (literally) of rusty .38 caliber revolvers from a departing helicopter unit that had written off the weapons as unserviceable. I detail stripped them, tossed all the metal in a bucket of solvent, and after a good soak, started cleaning them up. I managed to put together ten workable pistols from the mess. They were made available to the Staff Advisors who wanted to reward a counterpart who had been doing a good job. In order not to upset a more senior, but undeserving officer, some of the presentations were done on the sly, and the junior could make up his own story about how the weapon was obtained. In any case, the advisor/counterpart relationship was sometimes strengthened by such gestures of esteem and respect. As shown in paragraph 5 above, there is little an Advisor can do in some circumstances, but when a counterpart can be found that accepts the relationship and seeks to learn from an instructor/student or "let's work together on this" attitude, an Advisor can strengthen the Officer Corps of his assigned unit. Advisory personnel should be alert to the temptations that apply to both Advisors and to the Units being assisted. For someone looking to pocket some easy money, the confusion of war always offers opportunities. Some of these are legal, some in the gray area where they are perhaps legal, but morally wrong, and others illegal. If these practices occur, they can reflect adversely both on the individuals concerned and the Advisory Unit. Command briefings on the arrival of new advisors should include information on this subject. In Vietnam, news reports highlighted several cases of personnel accepting bribes and kickbacks while involved in contracting for Officer and NCO Club entertainment and supplies. I know of but could not prove the following: a. the illegal conversion of either the local currency or the military scrip into U.S. dollars. b. the trade in captured weapons or other war souvenirs for personal profit. c. the manufacture of fake enemy material for sale as souvenirs and personal profit.
0051 M0715 V71-72	Sorry I am late with this, but this was not a pleasant experience, I have difficulty dealing with it. Greatest benefit of my tour was the fine Marines I served with, some of the finest I have ever known.
0030 ME730 V72-73	Ensure young enlisted men/women are afforded the opportunity to learn the language & know their mission upon assignment. Teach them patience and to respect their counterpart. Don't go there with the intent of being a "hammer," but as a teacher with the willingness to take the time to understand the people you are trying to help.
0020 M0320 V72-73	I fully support your effort to prepare the next generations of "CoVans". I'd be honored to help in any way.
0016 M0628 V72-73	There are many ways to "skin a cat". Don't dismiss the possibility that your counterpart may prescribe a course of action that works well when dealing with his culture and environment. LISTEN CAREFULLY ALWAYS!
0043 M0643 V72	My experience, coordinator of the Air and Naval Gunfire served me well as a Tactics Instructor at AWS 1976-1979 and as head of the Tactical Exercise and Evaluation Control Group at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-nine Palms from 1982-1985.
0017 M0732 V72-73	I sponsored Lt. Col ____ ____ (CO, 9th VNMC Bn) and his family and I can reach him if you want his comments. He lives in Portland, Oregon.