CHAPTER Nine: Successful Incidents


Code	Actual event or incident in which everything went well
0049 M0620 V54-55	I was with the Chief MAAG's interpreter. At first it gave me the opportunity to discuss with the Chief MAAG, riding around in the back of the car on an informal basis, some of the problems that were plaguing the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps. I was a very comfortable thing. I had a nice opportunity to enjoy the ear of the man who fundamentally was the guy who would have to agree to these people being part of the Vietnamese Military establishment.
0050 M06__ V55-57 V68-69	Back when they were just colonial troops, I wanted to build a rifle range. And, I couldn't convince the CO of the Marine Battalion that was something they should have. I went over to talk to the Vietnamese Officer. This was a Vietnamese Naval Training Center. It was mainly for the training of young Vietnamese Naval Officers. Lt. ____ ____ was interested. I told him a rifle range was a good thing to have. I told him that I was getting a little reluctance from my Marine counterpart. He didn't say anything for a while, just that he was interested. A day or two after that, the CO of the Marine Battalion came to my office and said, "I have been thinking about a rifle range. What do you think about it?" I told him it was a great idea. That's the only way to do it. After a period of months, we built a really nice rifle range. But their shooting was not particularly good. As a matter of fact, it was lousy! I mentioned it to Colonel Croizat. He said the French were not all that "Gung Ho" about marksmanship. And, the Vietnamese were not either. I never got them to where they were really proficient with the weapon, which was the carbine, by the way. The Marine Advisors, over a period of years, got them to build a really first rate recruit training center. They had a first rate range, and I expect they were doing pretty well. The Recruit Training Center was modeled after Paris Island or San Diego. I understand that the Vietnamese DI's had been through the U.S. training center, and even used some of the language that our people use, translated into Vietnamese.
0039 M0523 V62-63	(Read 10 first) About two weeks after the situation described in 10, the Marines were given a warning order that our battalion would conduct another helicopter borne operation almost identical with the one earlier described. This time, however, we were ready. This was important to my being accepted as being able to make a contribution to the success of the battalion commander. I was the only person in the battalion who knew how to plan and conduct the operation. I had two weeks to train the battalion. I had a free hand; however, training had to be carried out concurrent with our normal daily sweep and destroy missions. The battalion commander was very interested in succeeding because we were informed that Vietnamese and American general officers would be at the dirt airstrip near the town of Camau to evaluate our helicopter operation. The training consisted of on-the-job actual planning of the operation. Every detail was planned out. Assignment of personnel and weapons to helicopters, time schedules, communication system for the airfield area consisting of human messenger similar to those used during the American Civil War. The myriad details that have to be considered for a vertical assault were accounted for. The net result was that the operation was a success, which was duly noted by the visitors who watched a smooth embarkation and followed the action at the LZ's on the situation map at the airstrip. As a result, that day, my counterpart was designated by the visitors as the most qualified, most competent expert in helicopter operations in the entire country. I am not exaggerating.
0026 M0630 V63-64	There were no events that went "well."
0008 M0527 V63	My counterpart, a Vietnamese Marine Captain, took three days leave and asked me to go with him to meet his family. They lived in a nearby province. The visit really helped me understand his viewpoint on the war and the activities we were engaged in.
0035 MW324 V63-64	(Summer of 1963) We, the Vietnamese Marines, had the opportunity to go to DaNang on an operation with the U.S. Marine Helicopter Squadron. While waiting to depart, the Vietnamese Marines cleaned their weapons. This impressed the U.S. pilots because this rarely occurred while transporting other troops.
0024 M0630 V64-65 G81-82	Please read my article in the Marine Corps Gazette, "It's been a hard day's night" - believe it came out in the late 60's. It is also in the RVN Marines history - Vol. II and discusses operations in Binh Dinh province, March/ April 1965. The "Crazy Buffalo" (2nd BN) received the U.S. Presidential citation for this combat operation.
0029 M0835 V64-65	Battalion was sent up to II Corp, the Am Lar Valley. Briefed by Province Advisor on scope of operation. The Province Advisor was new in country & would not listen - I disagreed with him as did my counterpart. We demanded better support - arty & air & finally got it. We spent a month in the area and had some success. You had to be patient and not expect results that were outstanding - it was a slow process but much was accomplished in the end. My point to be made is "Don't expect too much."
0034 M0632 V64-65	1- CIA thought the Marines were going to participate in a coup. 2- CIA wanted to meet secretly with Gen ____ ____. 3- He agreed only if I were present. 4- The meeting was at my villa. 5- He had no intention of being involved. He wasn't!
0040 M0427 V64-65 V72	I can't recall any event where everything went well. We almost always came out on the winning end of any small firefight or meeting engagement simply because our guys were always prepared to take the enemy under fire. The outcome of larger operations was usually determined by how much supporting arms fire we got from air and artillery units. Proper use of armored units is also essential. We didn't do it well. Instead of tanks supporting us, we had to keep the tanks from being destroyed. We seldom used to our 60 mm mortars because we couldn't carry enough ammo with us. Actual combat is so chaotic that the first, most important thing you have to do is to figure out what is going on. Where the enemy is located, how many they are and how you can best take them under fire.
0036 M0629 V65,68-69	Combined/joint air assault west of Tay Nimh with a brigade of 1st AIRCAV. Planning included - AirCAV Bn Cmdr, 6th VNMC Bn Cmndr, Advisors (SR & Ass't), Fire Support Officers. Op actually involved the insertion of 4 companies into two LZ's simultaneously. Each LZ prepped with artillery ToTs so that birds landed in two LZ's simultaneously but separated by less than 1 KM. All fires on target with less than 10 seconds are rounds (from 3 separate FSB's) and birds inbound. 12 slicks per line, with flanks covered by smoke ships & snakes of same time slicks inbound. USA & VNMC companies, secured LZ's and preceded on parallel axis to trap elements of NVA Bn. Op extraordinarily succeeded. Air CAVcade VNMC CO & me in C & C. Ass't ADV Capt _____ on deck. Area of Op was west of Tay Nimh towards Cambodian border. Enemy KIAs, elements of 9th NVA Div., 40-50 NVA KIA, multiple weapons. Great coordination, communication, well executed. Air assault tactics outstanding.
0023 M0530 V65-66	Helicopter assault with a VNMC battalion. Pre-Op orders and briefings. Organized for assault landing. Introduction into a "HOT" zone. Operations went well with CAS in the LZ's. We had arty and naval gunfire support. Resistance was moderate at first, then decreased as we attained objectives and reorganized. Attack next day was successful. Battalion commander operated well and coordinated supporting fires well. VC forces were enveloped, captured or destroyed. Some managed to escape. We didn't have blocking forces on our flanks, but generally we were successful.
0033 M0520 V65-66	An event that went well resulted in close air support for one of our operations. Through contact with USAF advisors to VNAF, we succeeded in getting their air force and navy talking to each other. On the operation the Vietnamese pilots delivered their ordinance with great accuracy. They flew AD's which had a payload of 10,000 pounds and could stay on station for 3 hours. It was an outstanding CAS aircraft from the infantry point of view. The presence of air support was a big morale factor.
0028 M0514 V70-71	Preparations for Lam Son 719 (Laotian incursion) went exceedingly well at the battalion level. Our counterparts planned for movement to contact and for the preparatory and on-call use of supporting arms to a degree that greatly surprised us. The lesson learned was that without us accompanying them into Laos they proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that they had absorbed the knowledge of how to employ effectively what they had generally ignored, simply because the Co Van would do it for them.
0038 M0423 V66-67	Can't remember that far back!
0018 M0637 V66-67	The senior advisor and I quickly saw that the battalion staff was not of great assistance to the battalion commander as they were often relegated to minor tasks. The battalion S-3, for example, was little more than a draftsman who kept the battalion commander's map up to date. Through a lot of "selling" and small steps we succeeded in getting the battalion commander to make more effective use of his S-3. Over time the S-3 became directly involved in planning operations, giving advice to the commander in the field, and--most important--looking ahead to what needed to be done in training and preparing the battalion for its missions. He and the other staff members became "players" rather than "observers."
0007 N0527 V67-68	Many of the Viet Nam Marines were married with families who lived in "camp follower" conditions. Medical care was almost non-existent. We felt we could alleviate much de-moralizing concern of the VN Marines if we could improve their living conditions. My area was medical care and we obtained medications and medical supplies from various sources, including the charitable organizations present in country. We also learned the location of several unassembled 20' x 48'quonset buildings which we arranged to obtain at no cost. We arranged for these buildings to be trucked from their location to the VNMC Recruit Training Center for assembly into a hospital for the VN Marines and their dependents. We also learned the location of a substantial quantity of cement and arranged to truck this valuable commodity to the VNMC Training Center for use in building concrete decks in the Quonset buildings. Although I rotated back to CONUS shortly after acquiring the above materials, I later was told that the project had been essentially completed as we had envisioned.
0019 M0304 V67	1. The VNMC Task force at My Tho July 1967 helo-assaulted into a rice paddy surrounded on two sides by a tree line. 2. They landed on top on an NVA regiment and were immediately pinned down in the landing zone. 3. The troops maintained fire and we coordinated artillery from the VNMC battery and two US batteries as well as air support from gunships and fixed wing aircraft. 4. We used Spooky to drop flares at night and kept up the artillery fire all night. 5. Early the next morning the NVA came out of the tree line in a wave attack against the VNMC troops. 6. We dropped artillery on the attacking waves and halted them. 7. The VNMC troops fixed bayonets and charged intro the NVA ranks, driving them out the back of the tree line into more artillery and air strikes. 8. The NVA body count at the end of the two-day struggle was over 400 killed. 9. The coordinated use of artillery, rotary and fixed wing air, and a resolved infantry element proved to be the successful combination.
0015 M0632 V68-69	Joint/combined planning for Riverine ops in the Mekong Delta. All parties, USN,VMC, USA,USAF worked together from start to finish. All were agreed on procedures and doctrine.
0001 M0323 V68-69	See item 2.
0002 M0520 V68-69	The Vietnamese Marines were either sent out as Brigade-sized Force with 2-3 Infantry Bn's and an artillery Btry, or they were attached as separate Bn's to either a US or ARVN Division for further operations in those Division AORs. The most memorable operation for me was being assigned a separate Bn for the first time to the 2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cav in III Corps Tactical Zone up near the Cambodian Border. As indicated in an earlier section we did not have luxury of formal briefs for every operation and some operations were just a continuation of the previous one. We were sent out by the 2d brigade to sit astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail at a known crossing point and wait for whatever happened our way just prior to Tet of 1969. The first night we received a 15 minute mortar barrage that walked our position up and down and left us with 19 casualties. The next morning we evacuated them and then proceeded on a route march that lead to first a firefight with a small NVA force and the discovery of the Arms cache described in #2 above. The rest is history. We were airlifted 11 times to different op areas within the 2d Brigade's AOR over a 42 day period fought several small battles and were then airlifted back to Saigon for R&R.
0042 ME720 V68-69	Tet 68 going to Cholon, with counter part, to deliver much needed supplies. was in a chev. pick-up that I had traded an AK-47 with a SeaB Chief. Was not concerned about speed, time was most important. Smashed into an Army Personnel carrier, Smashed it up, several army personnel, banged up. Counterpart and my self took care of the personnel, before continuing on supply mission. Army was very thankful not to be left to the mercy of the Cong. The NCO thought I was an Officer, because of the sholderboard I was wearing [my Vietnamese rank, made me look like a Capt..]. All in all it was two missions accomplished as one.
0027 M0633 V68-69	The J Gen Staff, RVN, seemed paranoid of the VNMC (supposedly because of CMCRVN LtGen _____ being a classmate (in NVN) of V Pres Ky and therefore a possible coup source) and kept its focus explicit - operating by Bns through III & IV Corps, and always under control of others (Province Chief or ARVN Win). Where the 5th BN CO (Major _____) declined to use tactics directed by a Province Chief (non-mil) he was recommended for court martial. And while "standing down" for trial near Bien Hoa, he and his Battalion intercepted a concerted VietCong attack on III Corps Headquarters and saved the convening authorities buttocks and their Headquarters. Major _____ was NOT court-martialed, was decorated, and his Bn got its first "R & R" in five years! The VNMC Bn Cmdr performed according to USMC standards.
0011 MW431 K62-63 V68-69	Most of our operations were in support of Infantry operations so like all ops they went as well as could be expected.
0012 M0523 V67-68 V71-72	I had suggested for my counterpart's consideration and our friendly discussion on the tactical value of the battalion's 81mm mortars during an opportune time between tactical operations [because I had observed on a prior operation that he had left his mortars in the battalion rear because of their heavy weight being transported by hand over hilly and very rugged terrain. then, during a subsequent tactical operation, he deployed his mortars to good use with his tactical elements. Neither of us ever even mentioned that his doing so might have been influenced by that prior discussion that I had initiated with him. From that experience, I learned that our discussions between tactical operations were a more opportune time to influence my counterpart than during the operations. Therefore, reinforcing the positive ideas and thinking/acting of counterpart and just ignoring the negative seemed most effective for me as an advisor.
0003 M0322 V69-70	I never saw my counterpart hold any drills for reaction to an enemy ground or mortar attack. I ask him if he has held drills or practice against attacks. I ask if everyone knew their place if we got mortared, and does everyone have a fighting hole if ground attacked? I said he should try it, use a whistle, one blast ground attack, two whistles mortar attack, everyone wandering around count as Dead! He said "Everybody knows, it's OK" As was the custom, we had a siesta after lunch for an hour. My counterpart and I slept in the back of a grass house. During the siesta, I dosed off and was awakened by the sound of a " WHISTLE ". My counterpart was not in his bunk. I peeked out to see this, and what did I see, troops wandering around with no foxhole. My counterpart started shouting commands and troops started digging. Next day same routine. I feigned sleep. Never said word. Within a couple days we were engaged in a ground attack. 1 KIA, 2WIA. After the smoke settled and the dead and wounded were evacuated, I put my am around my counterpart's shoulder and said, in hushed tone, "Did drill help?", his response, in hushed tone, "Thank You". That made my whole year!!!
0032 M0525 V69-70	I had been the deputy G -3, Riverine Ops, for the US 9th I.D. for 4-5 months when the Div. was returned to Ft. Lewis, WA. Hence I was familiar with all their AO and operations. IV Corps wanted a replacement because the Delta is a highly populated area. The US 9th ID left behind a large first class operational base armored landing craft, a boat repair facility, and artillery & barges on the MeKong River. Adm. Zumwalt was instrumental in getting the VN Marines and Navy to move in. In less than a month I led to convoy from VN Marine HQ to DongTam where both the Marines and the VN Navy wanted their own separate camps and HQ. After much pleading, and threatening, we were able to do it. This set the stage for all future joint operations in IV Corps, and the two staffs, once combined, operated relatively smoothly.
0010 M0833 V69-70 S90-91	I've written "Marine Corps Gazette" articles regarding this question. Instead of repeating those thoughts here, I may have expressed them much better in the articles. You could probably locate them via the "Gazette" or I could provide you the issue dates. I regret that I have no available copy to reference, but will research it for you as required or requested.
0044 M0303 V70-71	A river convoy left Solid Anchor on the Cua Lon River in MRIV about midnight Jan 1971. The convoy traveled east on the Cua Lon and Bo De Rivers. The VC must have known the convoy was coming because the convoy was ambushed at dawn. The Black Ponies were on station and I requested they run the banks of the river. The ambush was completely broken and the wounded medevaced.
0037 M0628 V70-71	I have two distinct recollections of cases in which a Co-van made a huge difference: During Lam Son 719 in 1977, Co-van Major _____ was riding in a jeep near one end of the old Marine air strip, when a l22mm round impacted near the other end. Bill jumped out of the jeep and shot a back azimuth to the suspected point of origin. Then he raced the jeep to the other end of the strip and shot another back azimuth. On his Khe Sanh map, saved from his days on Hill 881S in 1968, he plotted a resection that pinpointed a spot in a nearby Laotian valley. He remembered that there were a number of caves in that area, and the NVA would stow guns and ammo in them, rolling out the guns only long enough to fire. Bill got hold of a CAS aircraft nearby, and told him where to roll in hot. There were huge secondary explosions. Bill's father-in-1aw, Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, undoubtedly told him once that maps have memories. The second event did not happen on my watch, but to me it is a classic. An early (pre-l965) Co-van, Captain Dick _____, was working with his battalion in the U Minh Forest. Relatively new, he had not yet earned his spurs in battle. The battalion CP had been harassed by mortar fire at sundown for a couple of days -just a couple of rounds, with no chance for counter-battery fire before the mortar crew bugged out; Dick decided to do something about it. He figured the VC were using 82mm mortars at max range, so they could quickly back out beyond our 8lmm range. So he drew a circle (to scale) with a 3750m radius on his map, with the CP at the center, and looked for spots where clearings intersected with waterways, which had to provide their means of transportation through the thick jungle. One such spot fit the bill. Early the next morning, Dick adjusted an 81mm mortar on the suspected site, then paddled upstream to ensure that his rounds had landed on target. Returning to the CP" he sandbagged the mortar in position and went about his business during the day. Just before dusk. he returned to his mortar, picked up two rounds. and sat down-ready to load and fire. As soon as he heard the pneumatic thunk of the 82mm mortar, he dropped in his two rounds in rapid succession. There was a secondary explosion. Traveling upstream again, Dick and his buddies found a destroyed mortar, two dead gunners, and a beached sampan nearby. Life suddenly got very sweet for Dick within the battalion.
0005 M0734 V70-71 C56-58	The attack into Cambodia - Advisors were allowed to stay with their units and direct air and artillery strikes on the enemy.
0048 M06 V71	Advisory Units face a variety of unusual circumstances not normally encountered, and require the ability and the authority to adapt their equipment to fit the circumstances. They cannot wait for a year long review by a series of higher commands. As an example, the VNMC was used as a country level reserve, and shifted to hot spots throughout the area of operations. They moved from riverine style squad and platoon level operations in the delta area to battalion level fighting in I Corps along the DMZ. The distance from Advisory Unit headquarters in Saigon required long range communication equipment. ANGLICO units were not always available, and the Brigade Advisors had the need to talk on the naval gunfire nets.
0013 M0630 V71-72	Battalion was in open terrain and engaged by a company of armor (T-62s) supported by a regiment of infantry. Battalion Advisors were able to act as an independent source to report battlefield situation, request supporting arms, request appropriate reinforcements, make recommendations to counterpart as well as higher HQ and adjust supporting arms. Advisor's prior experience and training were critical to favorable outcome of battle. Advisors at battalion and brigade level collective prior combat experience, knowledge of each other and of supporting arms and communications equipment in use (AN/PRC-25s), I am convinced, added a "Force Multiplier" to the equation resulting in the favorable outcome.
0021 M0521 V71-72	In July, 1972, during the operation to retake Quang Tri, a CH53 was shot down early in the day. The decision to make an extraction of the downed crew came late in the afternoon, and by the time the mission got airborne, it was dark. Protective fires had been employed continuously around the downed crew to prevent enemy capture, and would be continued as long as necessary. That meant that they would have to be closely coordinated with the inbound aircraft( US Air Force Jolly Green and 4 A1 Skyraiders). The VNMC brigade S-3 and I worked together in doing that. As the flight was nearing the pickup point, a tank threat to our position developed a few kilometers away. We continued the protective fires, coordinating with the flight leader until such time as he was ready to descend into the pickup zone. On his mark, we shifted the fires to engage the tanks. Both missions were completed successfully.
0022 M0526 V71-72	7th VNMC Bn. mission of strategic reserve for northern I corps and based near DaNang. At the start of the Easter Invasion 1972 an order arrived at 11;00 to move north to reinforce MaiLoc. By 1500 the Bn. was loaded on 6x6 and headed North. No Intel passed just get there. No idea why, no plan of convoy security, just improvise. No frequencies for friendlies. At night when we encountered a local friendly road block, and ever little bridge had them, the Bn. XO would talk to the local security and clear it. Bn arrived with truck lights on and disembarked. Bn CO did not realize situation. Almost immediately NVA arty fire was received. Truck lights off and sent out. Bn. started foot march back along the way we came. Eventually settled in a village. No casualties. Word passed that next day we'd move out to accomplish mission of reinforcement of MAI Loc. Next day no transportation arrives. Finally the next day ARVN drivers arrive and Bn located south of Dong Ha loads and sets out on Motor march to Mai Loc. ARVN driver takes a turn too fast and flips over right in front of COVAN jeep. Most of one platoon either killed or injured. Motor march continues when word of NVA tanks deployed on route of march. Bn. leaves trucks and starts foot march into MaiLoc. We arrive during intense shelling of base. No comm due to quick deployment, no secure radio due to no codes. We set in and only get the longs that are being fired at the base. NVA either don't now we are there (which I doubt) or do not have the flexibility to change their fire plan. NVA mortars are firing at Mai Loc as close as 100 meters from our lines. Bn. A group (CO, SR ADV and 2 companies) set in while B group (XO, JR ADV and 2 companies) make contact. Word passed via the Advisor net (only secure comm) that 147 will be leaving Mai Loc at dusk. My counterpart does not believe the report. At BENT VNMC Brigade starts to leave Mai Loc. Order of march has 7th Bn. deployed as rear guard. B Cmd. group still in contact with the NVA and have trouble disengaging. A group takes off, Cmd. group over runs NVA mortar position and stops in the town of MAI Loc. NVA arty still hitting the base and fires are not adjusted on the column. Finally B group arrives with Jr. Advisor and 7th Bn. gets ready to move. Problem is that one of the four companies has tied into what is left of the 2 Bns that were there and they have started moving. Didn't see them again until we hit Ai Tu. Now we have 2 2/3 companies but only two effective since they are carrying their wounded and we pick up other wounded from the other Bns. We are joined by various civilians from the town, including the French Priest, and start out. Column at night becomes separated and 7th Bn. is left to find it's own way out. Counterpart picks compass azimuth as route of march. We cross and re-cross the river at least 4 times sometimes on air mats, when counterpart finally takes my suggestion to remain on the high ground and follow the river. There is no comm. Finally establish comm with an OE and relay to them who and where we are and instruct them to pass the word. It takes us over 40 hours to finally reach HWY 1 but not before an ARVN unit starts hitting us with mortars. That is cleared up by an irate Advisor. So-we accomplished the mission of reinforcing Mai Loc and somewhat covered (rear guard) the rear of the main column AND made it out to HWY 1 still an effective force once the other company joined us. All is "well" that ends well'-Lesson learned-The fog of war!
0045 M0536 V71-72	A personage who created positive situations was a Marine Captain assigned to the VNMC and the RVN Airborne division as ANGLICO. He couldn't speak the language very well. The tonal Vietnamese conflicted with his Northern New Jersey accent. But he was widely accepted by both VNMC and Airborne counterparts, senior and junior. He displayed respect for the culture, and a sincere willingness to learn from his counterparts, as well as offer his own insights. He had the rare mixture of devotion to duty and warm personality that the Vietnamese admired. While some advisors were aloof, and at times voiced disdain for the Vietnamese, this advisor never let his professional guard down, even under stress and during obvious debacles. As a result, both Vietnamese and other advisors sought him out. By virtue of professional competence and shear force of personality, he successfully accomplished his mission. Lesson: Select your advisor group carefully.
0051 M0715 V71-72	During counter-attack to retake Quang Tri we used VNMC artillery, US NGF and Close Air Support with Army Cav Troop operating underneath of it within 200 yds of target.
0016 M0628 V72-73	A TOW missile was delivered to our position. A U.S. Army sergeant gave Vietnamese Marines a class on how to fire the TOW. The following morning we witnessed destruction of a Russian T-54 tank by the TOW when we were attacked by 10 Russian tanks (5 T-54s and 5 PT-76s)
0017 M0732 V72-73	The NVA had driven the South Vietnamese forces south from the DMZ. The VNMC battalion I was with was given the mission to stop the enemy's advance on the edge of a small river. The battalion commander set up a defense in depth which consisted of three lines of defenders on the near side of the river focused on the bridge which could not be blown initially because ARVN forces fleeing south needed it to escape across the river. The Bn Cmdr emplaced mines and infantry with anti-tank weapons along the major highway. Artillery support was registered. In the early morning just before dawn the enemy in PT-76s (lightly armored tanks) roared down the highway. Initially the VN Marines thought the enemy was more ARVN forces fleeing south, but the Bn Cmdr realizing the situation ordered the third line of troops to fire. The enemy strung out in column was devastated by the fire from all three lines as soon as the VN Marines realized the vehicles were enemy. Air and artillery support was called in. Many of the tanks were destroyed by VNMC infantry but some were destroyed by air, artillery, and mines. The type of NVA unit involved was organized to have 18 PT-76's, 17 tanks were confirmed destroyed and the joke among the VN Marines was that the 18th tank was heading back to Hanoi as fast as the tank could travel. The VN Marines had suffered only a few slightly wounded and the battalion had stopped the NVA Easter offensive advance in to South Vietnam.
0030 ME730 V72-73	I was leaving Phu Bat Army Base with supplies and ARVN 2 ½ ton truck carrying howitzer rounds lost control and overturned in front of me. I immediately went to the aid of the trapped persons inside the vehicle. I could hear them but the inability to talk to them in their language was frustrating to me. It prevented my being able to know from them their fear and the extent of possible injuries. I was able to crawl inside the truck & cut the canvas top out to get the ARVN troops out of the truck, but I am sure it would have been more reassuring to the ARVN Troops if I could have spoken to them in Vietnamese.
0043 M0643 V72	During the monsoon season, June 72, the S-3 of the 5th Battalion called for me. Requested "Naval Gunfire Here!" pointing to a map some 13 clicks North of our position. It was raining very hard, visibility 2 feet. The policy for naval gunfire employment must be able to observe and adjust. But driven by my desire to do a good job, I mounted an observation position on a standing wall of a destroyed building (as I would under normal conditions to run air on direct naval gunfire) and called in the mission "Will observe and adjust requested volley of 6, on my 3rd adjustment (what I thought would be my last), "right 50 drop 50, fire for effect," suddenly through the dense rain, bright flashes appeared and continued throughout the night into the next day. We hit a large ammo dump and it cooked for 3 days. The S-3 grew up in the Quang Tri Province; knew the most logical place in the area where large quantities of ammo could be stored and kept dry was in the target area and we hit the jackpot.
0020 M0320 V72-73	On 13 May 1972, after 6 weeks of tactical defeat (unbelievable military and civilian loss of life) and loss of significant area in the northern I-Corps, 2 Bns of the VNMC staged a daring helo-borne assault on the Hai Lang district HQ held by a NVA regiment. I was one of two USMC advisors with the 6th VNMC Bn. Preassault fire planning including U.S. air, naval gunfire, and preplanned B-52 strikes, coupled with VNMC artillery, and a solid tactical maneuver plan was conducted as if it were being done in an Amphibious Warfare School class. Air and NGF prepped the landing zones and target area, as our Bn flew in low in USMC helicopters. We got over 400 assault troops in on the first wave and immediately began the frontal attack. Within two hours we had total control of the objective and begin pursuing the enemy by supporting fires. We then began a 12 hour attack back toward our lines. We encountered and attacked many enemy units cut of from their regiment. We returned to our lines south of My Chang River around 11:00pm. The joint U.S./Vietnamese planning and the perfect execution by the VNMC Bns made this a storybook case of tactical operations.
0009 M0628 V72-73	In the final combat action wherein USMC advisors participated, the VN Marines pushed up the coast and captured the NVA base at the mouth of the Cua Viet River. I was the senior USMC advisor to Task Force Tango, commanded by the Ass't Cmdt of the VN Marine Corps. As I mentioned before I had trained 3-4 junior officer's on calling Naval gunfire and we had unlimited ammunition available. The destroyers and cruisers wanted to empty their bunkers. My advisory team worked with the TF 3 and FSC prior to jump off and plotted prep targets and known positions. The operation started off with the lieutenants calling in gunfire as the Task Force started up the coast line.. We had a great sense of pride and accomplishment in their capabilities.